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Abstract
Empirical literature and related legal practice using concentration as a proxy for competition measurement
are prone to a fallacy of division, as concentration measures are appropriate for perfect competition and
perfect collusion but not intermediate levels of competition. Extending the classic Cournot-type competi-
tion model of Cowling and Waterson (1976) and Cowling (1976) used to derive the Hirschman-Herfindahl
Index (HHI) of market concentration, we propose an adaptation of this model that allows collusive rents
for all, none, or some of the firms in a market. Application of our model and new critical mass measures to
data for U.S. commercial banks in the period 1984-2004 confirms that concentration measures are unreliable
competition metrics. Our results lead us to conclude that critical mass is a promising new market power
metric for competition analyses. Policy and future research implications are briefly discussed.
Keywords: SCP hypothesis, competition, Cournot, conjectural variation, Hirschman Herfindahl index,
aggregation bias
JEL: G21, L11, L22
Fallacy of division: The error of assuming that what is true about something must also be true of all or some of its
parts.
1. Introduction
Concentration measures, such as the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), are commonly used as prox-
ies for competition. Increases in market concentration are believed to increase the potential for collusion,
as a negative causal relationship between market concentration and competition is typically assumed (e.g.,
Cournot-type models). However, both the direction and the validity of the relationship between compe-
tition and market concentration can be challenged. A prime example in the industrial organization (IO)
literature is the two player Bertrand competitive market model which demonstrates that the number of
firms in the market as well as market concentration can be poor proxies for competition (Tirole, 1988).1
Recent work by Boone (2008) further illustrates the advantages of alternative competition models, and a
IAn earlier, now redundant version of this paper appeared as "A Fallacy of Division: The Failure of Market Concentration as
a Measure of Competition in U.S. Banking,Ó TKI Working Paper 09-3. We thank Mette Asmild, Jan Boone, Arnound Boot, Keith
Cowling, Claire Economidou, Michiel de Jong, Martien Lamers, Ryan van Lamoen, Timothy Riddiough, Stephanie Rosenkranz, Utz
Weitzel, Minyan Zhu, participants at the EURO Working Group on Efficiency & Productivity Analysis (EWG-EPA) 2010 International
Conference in Chania (Greece), as well as seminar participants at Maastricht University (the Netherlands) and Utrecht School of
Economics (the Netherlands) for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
∗Corresponding author.
Email addresses: j.bos@maastrichtuniversity.nl (Jaap W.B. Bos), ivy_yeeling@yahoo.com.hk (Yee Ling Chan),
j-kolari@tamu.edu (James W. Kolari), j.yuan81@gmail.com (Jiang Yuan)
1To some extent the assumptions underlying different IO competition models can be tested. For example, there is extensive
literature on the effects of price versus non-price competition on market contestability and entry barriers as well as (tacit) collusion.
See Hausman and Sidak (2007), Salop and Scheffman (1983), Kahai et al. (1996), Borenstein (1990), Riordan (1998), Shepherd (1972),
Klein (2001), Evans and Kessides (1993), and Martin (1988).
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related branch of literature (e.g., Goppelsroeder et al., 2008) documents aggregation problems in construct-
ing market concentration measures. Other studies consider various aspects of concentration measures as
proxies for competition by taking into account the notion of strategic behavior among a segment of firms
in a market2 and the existence of large, dominant firms.3 Particularly relevant to the present paper, this
literature highlights the notion of possible dominant firms.4
Despite controversy surrounding HHI’s usage in competition analyses (White, 2008; Elhauge, 2007), it
is routinely applied to mergers by the U.S. Department of Justice. If a merger increases HHI by 100 points,
it will likely be under scrutiny by the Antitrust Division.5 According to horizontal merger guidelines by
the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission effective since 1992, any market with a post-
merger HHI between 1,000 and 1,800 is moderately concentrated, and markets with HHI above 1,800 are
concentrated. Recognizing the limitations of market concentration measures, HHI figures are interpreted
by authorities in the context of a variety of market conditions, including (for example) the introduction
of a new technology through a merger, rise of demand substitutes, growth rate of the market, and entry
barriers.
In this paper we demonstrate the limitations of concentration measures as proxies for competition in
the context of the classic Cournot-type competition model. By adapting this model for different levels of
competition, we obtain critical mass as a new measure of market power. Critical mass is defined as the
market share at which firms reach market power. A number of related competition measures are manifest,
including the percentage of firms with market power, the first year in which at least one firm gained market
power, the marginal effect on markup of an increase in market share, the percentage of the markup due to
market power, and the dollar value of profits due to rents of colluding firms. Our derivation of critical mass
builds upon the seminal work of Stigler (1964) popularized by Cowling and Waterson (1976) and Cowling
(1976)(henceforth CW and CL).6 Extending these studies, we assume that an increase in market share and
coincident increase in market concentration may result in market power but not necessarily for all firms in
the market. Hence, although we similarly model and test for Cournot-type competition, we do so allowing
for the possibility that collusion is not necessarily either absent or omnipresent. As such, collusive rents
may be earned by all, none, or some of the firms in the market. Following Stigler (1964), we assume that
collusion becomes more attractive as firms increase their market share due to rising potential losses from
not colluding. By modifying the CW and CL model in this way, the critical mass for firms in a market can be
derived. Our proposed model incorporates the three classic outcomes of the SCP hypothesis as formulated
by CW, CL, and others: (1) for monopoly the critical mass is 100 percent and only one firm has this market
share, (2) for perfect competition the critical mass is higher than the highest market share in the market,
and (3) for Cournot myopic oligopoly among all firms the critical mass is lower than the lowest market
share in the market. Application of our model and new critical mass measure to data for U.S. commercial
banks in the period 1984-2004 confirms that concentration measures are unreliable competition metrics.
While collusion is prevalent in the banking industry at the state level, the critical mass, rents earned from
collusion, and collusive concentration levels vary widely across states. These and other results lead us to
conclude that critical mass is a promising new market power metric for competition analyses.
Forthcoming sections develop our proposed model and derivative critical mass measure, present em-
pirical results for the U.S. banking industry, and conclude. An important policy implication of our results
2See Salop and Scheffman (1983), Evans and Kessides (1993), and Riordan (1998). An excellent review is provided in Scherer and
Ross (1990).
3See Borenstein (1990), Buschena and Perloff (1991), Kahai et al. (1996), and Klein (2001).
4In describing the relation between industry profit rates and concentration, Bain (1951) noted that "... major reliance will have to
be placed upon group averaging and upon comparison of group average profit rates at different levels of concentration ..." (p. 309),
and "... it is essential in this setting to know whether intragroup variance is of such magnitude as to obliterate the significance of any
difference discovered between group averages" (p. 310). As observed by Martin (1988), Bain (1956) posited that small firms would
not benefit from market concentration and entry barriers sufficient to support effective collusion, which engenders the possibility of
a leading-firm group.
5Throughout this paper, we measure HHI as the sum of squared market shares, where the latter are between 0 and a 100, which
yields a maximum HHI of 10,000.
6For further discussion of HHI, see Adelman (1969), Acar and Sankaran (1999), Kwoka (1998), and others.
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is that government merger policies based on concentration measures should be broadened in scope to en-
compass critical market share and related information.
2. Methodology
CW and CL employed a Cournot model to derive the relation between industry markup and HHI. The
model’s intuitive appeal and straightforward applicability have contributed to its widespread usage. Im-
portantly, these authors assume that the relationship between each firm’s markup and market share is the
same for all firms in a market, which allows aggregation of these variables. In so doing, empirical estima-
tion of the model is effectively reduced to tests of perfect collusion and perfect competition at the industry
level. Only in these two extreme cases is each firm representative of all other firms in the market, and
the estimated coefficient for HHI in the test of the resulting SCP relation is either insignificantly different
from zero (perfect competition) or unity (perfect collusion). For these two cases there is no fallacy of di-
vision. Relevant to the present study, what happens in intermediate cases when the coefficient for HHI
lies between zero and unity? Their model implies that there is some collusion. But how much? And by
whom? Here empirical tests of the model are inconclusive, as the coefficient on HHI (as well as many other
concentration measures) can only be compared on an ordinal scale (Kwoka, 1985, 1998; Bikker and Haaf,
2002).
2.1. The Cournot model revisited
Revisiting the original Cournot model by CW and CL, each firm chooses its output Xi based on rivals’
output levels and seeks to maximize profits Πi:7
Πi = pXi − ci(Xi) s.t.
p = f (X) = f (∑Ni=1 Xi), i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N
(1)
where f (X) is the inverse demand function. The first order maximization condition of equation (1) is:
∂Πi
∂Xi
= p + Xi f ′(X)
∂X
∂Xi
− c′i(Xi) = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N (2)
where
∂X
∂Xi
= 1+
∂∑Nj=1 Xj
∂Xi
= 1+ λi, j 6= i (3)
and λi is the conjectural variation of firm i, which measures the output reaction of its rivals to a change
in its own output with −1 ≤ λi,t ≤ 1. Whereas a myopic Cournot oligopoly implies λi,t = 0, collusive
oligopoly and perfect competition imply λi,t > 0 and λi,t = −1, respectively. Equation (2) can therefore be
rewritten by multiplying the left-hand-side by XiXi and right-hand-side by
X
X and then dividing both sides
by p to obtain:
pXi − c′i(Xi)Xi
pXi
=
Xi
X
f ′(X)X
p
(1+ λi), (4)
where c′i(Xi)Xi is the total cost of firm i’s output, and p− c′i(Xi)Xi is firm i’s net profit. Thus, the left-hand-
side of equation (4) is firm i’s markup, also known as the Lerner index Li (Lerner, 1934). Firm i’s market
share θi is given by
Xi
X , and the inverse price elasticity of demand
1
η , which is assumed to be the same for
all firms, is given by f
′(X)X
p . Adding time subscripts t, we can now write:
Li,t = (− 1ηt )θi,t(1+ λi,t). (5)
7Without loss of generality, we only consider the total costs of a firm (ci), rather than its fixed and variable costs.
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Thus, each firm’s Lerner index depends on the (market) price elasticity of demand, firm market share, and
its conjectural variation.
2.2. Proposed model and critical mass
CW and CL make two key assumptions.8 First, by aggregating equation (5) over all N firms and either
assuming that the price elasticity of demand is constant over time or can be captured by control variables,
they specify a relationship between industry mark-up and HHI.9 Subsequent papers have (erroneously)
used this result to test for competition by estimating the relationship between firm mark-up and HHI.
We will return to this issue in Section 2.4. Second, and relatedly, they crucially assume (as well as many
empirical tests of the SCP hypothesis) that conjectural variation λi,t is an omitted variable. In this respect,
CW and CL rely upon Stigler (1964), who argued that the (pricing) behavior of firms must be inferred from
the way their customers react. From Stigler’s rule, we know that "[T]here is no competitive price-cutting if
there are no shifts of buyers among sellers ..." (Stigler, 1964, p. 48).
Stigler proved that, given the de facto existence of collusive behavior, the extent to which firms will
engage in collusive behavior is directly related to their market share. To see why, following Stigler (1964),
assume that a firm targets three groups of customers: new customers, its own old customers, and other
firms’ old customers.10 The firm wants to garner its share of the growth of each group.11 For each group
the cost of cheating (i.e., not behaving collusively) is given by the variance of the expected number of
customers.12 The higher this variance, the more likely a firm is to exhibit collusive behavior. Since the three
groups are disjoint subsets of the whole customer population, we can simply add up their variances.13
Consequently, if an increase in market share (θi) makes cheating more costly, it will lead to an increase in
awareness (λi,t) and thereby facilitate collusive behavior. This outcome is supported by the fact that the
variance of a firm’s expected number of customers increases with an increase in its market share.14
Stigler’s rule is used by CW, CL, and others to treat a firm’s conjectural variation λi,t as an implicit
function of its market share. Importantly, the resultant empirical specification only leads to conclusive
results if all firms have the same conjectural variation. From equation (5) we can see that this condition
holds for two extreme scenarios. First, if all firms behave as myopic Cournot oligopolists, then λi,t = 0 for
all firms, such that, for a given price elasticity of demand, an increase in θi leads to an exactly proportional
increase in the Lerner index. Second, in the case of perfect competition, an increase in market share has
no impact on performance, as λi,t = −1 for all firms. However, returning to our earlier questions, what
happens for other intermediate values of λi,t? And how much does the impact of an increase in λi,t on the
Lerner index depend on a firm’s market share?
To answer these questions, we propose the following Lerner index specification:
Li,t = βi + βθ · θi,t + βλ · λi,t + βθ·λ · (θi,t · λi,t) + Controls + εi,t. (6)
8See Bikker and Bos (2008).
9To be precise, CW include two specifications of their model. In the second specification, they allow for the existence of unequal
size firms as determined by their different marginal cost functions. This specification leads to an equality between a slightly modified
conjectural variation and HHI. An intuitive way of deriving this result from equation (4) is by multiplying the right-hand-side by XiXi ,
where the denominator of the latter term finds its way into the remainder of the equation, and the numerator (after aggregating the
entire equation over N firms) yields HHI instead of firms’ market share.
10Let: Qn = number of new customers; Qo = the total number of old buyers in the market; and qio = the number of old customers for
firm i.
11First, it wants a share of the new customers (Dn). Second, it wants to retain as many old customers as possible (Dr). And, third, it
wants to win over other firms’ old customers (Do).
12With the probability of repeat purchases denoted p, the expected number of firm j’s customers for each group is given by: E(Din) =
θi ∗Qn; E(Dir) = p ∗ θi ∗Qo ; and E(Dio) = (1− p) ∗ θi ∗ (Qo − qio).
13A firm expects a consumer to either become a customer (with expectations dependent on its current market share) or not. Thus, for
the binomial mean µ = n ∗ p, variance is n ∗ p(1− p), such that variances for each group are given by: var(Din) = [Qn ∗ θi ∗ (1− θi)];
var(Dir) = [Qo ∗ p ∗ θi ∗ ((1− p)θi)]; and var(Din) = [(Qo − qi0) ∗ (((1− p)θi) ∗ (1− (1− p)θi))].
14In fact: ∂var(C
i
n)
∂θi
= Qn − (2 ∗Qn ∗ θi) > 0; ∂var(D
i
r)
∂θi
= pQo − (2 ∗Qo ∗ p2 ∗ θi) > 0; and ∂var(D
i
o)
∂θi
= ((1− p)(Qo − qi0))− (2(1− p) ∗
(Qo − qi0) ∗ θi) > 0. The first and last equations hold iff θi < 0.5. The remaining equation holds iffp > 2p2 ∗ Mθi . If θi < 0.5, this
condition is satisfied also.
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Equation (6) differs from previous specifications in two ways. First, we do not aggregate but instead relate
the firm’s markup to its market share. Second, rather than treating λi,t as an omitted variable, we include
it in our empirical specification. In Section 2.3 we elaborate on the measurement and importance of λi,t. In
Section 2.4, we explain our choice for this particular specification.
For now, to see how equation (6) can be used to reduce the fallacy of division, in line with Stigler’s rule,
we utilize it to determine how large a firm needs to be to act as a collusive oligopolist. From equation (6)
note that:
∂Li,t
∂λi,t
= βλ + βθ·λ · (θi,t). (7)
Recall that for the oligopolist λi,t ≥ 0. Therefore, we are interested in knowing at what point ∂Li,t∂λi,t = 0.
Setting the derivative in equation (7) equal to zero and rewriting yields:
θ∗ = − βλ
βθ·λ
, (8)
where θ∗ is the critical mass defined as the market share at or beyond which firms collude. Denoting
the lowest (highest) market share in a market by θmin (θmax), we can relate this result to CW and CL by
observing that in the case of perfect competition θ∗ > θmax, whereas in the case of an oligopoly θ∗ < θmin.
Moreover, the notion that the likelihood of collusion increases with market share is consistent with Stigler
(1964), and θi,t ≥ θ∗ nicely identifies dominant firms (Scherer and Ross, 1990).
Table 1: New competition measures
Abbreviation Description Calculation
θ∗ critical mass − βλ
βθ·λ
%∗ percentage of firms with market power
(
∑ n|θi,t ≥ θ∗
∑ n
)
∗ 100
n∗ annual average number of firms with market power ∑ n|θi,t ≥ θ
∗
number of years that year ≥ year∗
year∗ first year in which at least one firm had market power year|θi,t ≥ θ∗, year−t 6= year∗, for t = 1, ..., T
m f x∗ marginal effect of an increase in market share βθ + βθ·λ · λi,t
rents percentage of the markup attributable to market power
(
∑ Lˆi,t|θi,t ≥ θ∗
∑ n|θi,t ≥ θ∗
)
−
(
∑ Lˆi,t|θi,t < θ∗
∑ n|θi,t < θ∗
)
(
∑ Lˆi,t|θi,t < θ∗
∑ n|θi,t < θ∗
) ∗ 100
dollar bonus dollar value of the profits (in thousands) attributable to rents rents100 ∗ pXi,t − fixed costs
For each market the number of firm-year observations included in an estimation is n = 1, ..., N, and the number of years is t = 1, ..., T.
As shown in Table 1, equation (6) enables new insights into the level of competition in a market. Not
only can the critical mass, θ∗, be identified, but the percentage of firms which currently operate at or be-
yond that critical market share, %∗, can be estimated. From estimations of equation (6), we can further
calculate the number of firms with market power, n∗.15 Also, we can determine the first year in which
there was market power, year∗. Moreover, although the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976) applies, we may be
15This measure is logically similar to the simple concentration ratio obtained by summing the market shares of a subset of the
largest firms, Cn, where n is the number of the largest firms.
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interested in evaluating the marginal effect of an increase in market share on the Lerner index, m f x∗, to
assess the competitive effects of a merger or takeover, or more generally, an increase in relative size. Fi-
nally, when there is market power, we can calculate both the rents of colluding firms and the dollar amount
of additional profits they derive from their collusive behavior. We do so by assuming that the difference
between the average markup of the firms with and without market power is the direct result of collusion.16
For policy purposes a more in-depth knowledge of the competitive conditions in a market is often re-
quired. When deciding whether or not to approve a merger, the current level of competition is only one
piece of required information. The competition measures in Table 1 provide potentially valuable informa-
tion in this connection. Additionally, such information may be useful to researchers (for example) seeking
to explain an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation (Aghion et al., 2005; Aghion
and Griffith, 2005; Aghion et al., 2001). In this case the optimal level of innovation may require a (slightly)
positive markup (e.g., see recent U.S. commercial bank evidence by Bos et al., 2009). For industries that
are considered to play a key role in the economy, such as the banking sector, there may also be a trade-off
between competition and (financial) stability that warrants a (slightly) positive markup (Allen and Gale,
2003). More generally, a variety of other potential applications of the proposed competition measures are
readily conceivable.
2.3. Collusion and critical mass
In the model of CW and CL, competition is measured at the firm level by each firm’s conjectural varia-
tion λi,t, or the way it expects other firms to react to a change in the size of its operations. Our derivation
so far has relied upon the interaction between the firm’s current market share θi,t and λi,t. Hence, given the
theoretical setting of this model, we have shown that the assessment of competition brings together both a
static market view (as reflected by market shares) and a dynamic market view (as reflected by each firm’s
conjectural variation). Since these two views are intertwined, as larger firms are expected to perceive differ-
ent reactions to a change in their output than smaller firms, equation (6) includes the interaction between
market share and conjectural variation.
In our interpretation of the marginal effect of an increase in conjectural variation (conditional on market
share) on the Lerner index, we relied upon Stigler’s (1964) analysis and argued that the likelihood of collu-
sion increases with market share. The latter argument allows us to define critical mass, which represents a
dividing line between those that collude and those that do not. In an empirical specification it is desirable
to test whether firms with (without) critical mass indeed (do not) collude. As such, we next propose: (1)
an estimation strategy, and (2) a way of deriving each firm’s conjectural variation λi,t that allows us to
distinguish between firms with and without market power.
2.3.1. Estimation strategy
In equation (3) we defined each firm’s conjectural variation λi,t as
∂∑Nj=1 Xj
∂Xi
, j 6= i. When estimating
equation (6), a correction may be necessary to control for endogeneity, as this equation includes market
share measured as XiX . Without this correction, the estimated coefficients may be biased. In turn, the
conditional marginal effect of λi,t on the Lerner index may be inconsistent and therefore unreliable for the
purpose of policy making. Also, including the interaction between market share and conjectural variation
increases multicollinearity, thereby increasing the standard errors and reducing the likelihood that the
estimated coefficient on the interaction term will be significant.
It is obvious that equation (6) may suffer from potential endogeneity due to including both the level
of each firm’s output (i.e., its market share) and change in output (i.e., its conjectural variation) plus the
output levels and changes of all other firms combined. Hence, the treatment of conjectural variation as an
16Of course, this approach to calculating both the rents and the dollar bonus is subject to criticism. The most obvious problem is
that this comparison does not take into account other ways in which the two groups of firms differ, most notably related to size such
as scale economies. However, note that, even in the extreme case in which there are constantly increasing economies of scale, large
firms are not guaranteed a higher markup in the case of perfect competition. Rather, large firms would be expected to drive small
firms out of the market, in part by undercutting them, thus effectively operating with a lower markup.
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exogenous regressor is an empirical issue. To address this issue we estimate equation (6) in three alternative
ways:
Li,t =βi + β1θi,t + β2λi,t + β3(θi,tλi,t) + βx(Controlsi,t) + ei,t (9a)
∆Li,t =β1∆θi,t + β2∆λi,t + β3∆(θi,tλi,t) + βx∆(Controlsi,t) + ∆ei,t (9b)
∆Li,t =β1∆θi,t−1 + β2∆λi,t−1 + β3∆(θi,t−1λi,t−1) + βx∆(Controlsi,t) + ∆ei,t. (9c)
The basic specification (9a) is a fixed effect panel estimation that ignores possible endogeneity issues. Spec-
ifications (9b) and (9c) instrument for the three key variables in our model: market share, conjectural vari-
ation, and the interaction between these two variables. Equation (9b) is estimated in first differences and
includes an instrument based on the third and fourth lags of θi,t, λi,t and θi,tλi,t. Equation (9c) is also esti-
mated in first differences, and instruments the lags of θi,t, λi,t and θi,tλi,t with the fourth and fifth lags of
each variable.
Endogeneity tests for one or more endogenous regressors involve testing the difference between the
Sargan-Hansen statistic for the equation with the smaller set of instruments (i.e., equation (9a) in our case)
and the equation with the larger set of instruments (i.e., equations (9b) and (9c)). Under the null hypothesis
that the specified endogenous regressors are exogenous, this test statistic has a chi-squared distribution.17
For our purposes, because homoskedasticity is not required, we use the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.18
We begin by estimating both equations (9a) and (9b). If our tests confirm that we cannot reject at least
one of our regressors as endogenous, we proceed to test equations (9b) and (9c). Unless otherwise noted,
reported results are always based on the first specification that produces unbiased results.
Of course, we are not only concerned about the unbiasedness of the estimated coefficients, but poten-
tial multicollinearity associated with the inclusion of the interaction between market share and conjectural
variation.19 According to Brambor et al. (2006, p. 70), multicollinearity raises suspicion when the estimated
coefficients in a linear-additive model change due to including an interaction term.20 However, in our anal-
ysis, rather than being interested in the average effect of a variable, we focus on the sign and significance
of the conditional marginal effect of conjectural variation on the Lerner index. That is, the significance of
the expression in equation (7) is our focal point, not the significance of βλ and βθ·λ. From Brambor et al.
(2006) we know that the variance of the conditional marginal effect in equation (7) is:
σˆ2δLi,t
δλi,t
= var(βˆλ) + θ2i,tvar(βˆθ·λ) + 2θi,tcov(βˆλ βˆθ·λ). (10)
Using equations (7) and (10), marginal effects and their significance can be evaluated at different levels of
market share θi,t. In our empirical analysis, unless otherwise noted, we evaluate the marginal effect at the
critical mass θ∗i,t.
2.3.2. Collusion among those that have market power
Do firms with a market share at or above the critical mass behave more collusively than other firms?
Following Stigler (1964), we know that collusion is (more) feasible if each colluding firm expects other firms
not to react to changes in its own output. In other words, among colluding firms, changes in profits (or the
Lerner index) result from either changes in its own output or changes in its marginal cost but not from
17The degrees of freedom are equal to the number of regressors tested.
18As shown by Hayashi (2000, pp. 233-234), the standard test statistic is numerically equal to a Hausman test statistic only under
conditional homoskedasticity, whereas the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is not.
19Centering has been suggested as a way of mitigating multicollinearity issues. As pointed out by Brambor et al. (2006) and Kam
and Franzese Jr. (2007), centering does not provide us with more accurate data, and "... although the algebraic transformation that
results from centering the variables will result in different coefficients and standard errors in the centered model compared to those
in the uncentered model, ... this is because they measure different substantive quantities in each model and not because one model
produces better estimates than the other" (Brambor et al., 2006, p. 71).
20See also Friedrich (1982).
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stealing away (losing) earnings from (to) its colluding competitors. Hence, if industry profits change, it is
not because profits are reallocated among oligopolists.
We next utilize this view of collusion to once more derive λi,t, in order to design an empirical validation
test for the critical mass measure θi,t. We start by considering changes in the industry markup. Letting Πi,t
(Ri,t) be profits (total revenues) of firm i at time t, we can write the industry markup at time t as:
Lt =
Πt
Rt
=
∑i Πi,t
∑i Ri,t
=∑i Li,tθi,t =
∑i Πi,t
Ri,t
Ri,t
∑i Ri,t
, (11)
where Πi,t again denotes firm profits (pXi − ci(Xi)), and Ri,t denotes firm revenues (pXi,t). From equation
(5) we can write:
Lt =∑i
[(
− 1
ηt
)
θi,t(1+ λi,t)
]
. (12)
Also, the change in industry L is:
∆Lt =∑i
[(
− 1
ηt
)
θi,t(1+ λi,t)
]
−∑i
[(
− 1
ηt−1
)
θi,t−1(1+ λi,t−1)
]
. (13)
At this point we make two additional assumptions. First, we assume that the market price elasticity of
demand η is constant. Constant price elasticity is commonly used in empirical demand analyses due to
the success of log-linear demand functions (Iwata, 1974, p. 949). Also, empirical studies have found that
the market price elasticity of demand is relatively constant (Teles and Zhou, 2005, p. 57).21 Second, we
assume that the conjectural variation of an individual firm is constant in the short run. In the short run
firms use historical data to predict their rivals’ production and decide on their own output levels. Now we
can combine equation (12) with equation (13) to write:22
∑i −
1
η
(1+ λi)∆θi,t =∑i[∆Li,t · θi,t−1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
operate in t and t-1︸ ︷︷ ︸
within effect
+∑i[∆θi,t · (Li,t−1 − Lt−1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
operate in t and t-1
+∑i[∆Li,t · ∆θi,t]︸ ︷︷ ︸
operate in t and t-1
+∑i[∆θi,t · Lt−1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
operate only in t
.
︸ ︷︷ ︸
reallocation effect
(14)
Equation (14) clearly captures the effect of collusion on the industry markup. For the myopic Cournot
oligolopolist, changes in the industry markup are purely from within each firm. Since firms do not capture
market share at the expense of others, changes in the industry markup arise from the within effect (Stiroh,
2000; Stiroh and Strahan, 2003). However, increasing competition leads to increasing reallocation effects,
as firms expropriate each others’ market shares.23
Therefore, in order to derive an expression for λi,t, we write equation (14) at the firm level. Removing
summations, dividing both sides by ∆θi,t, and simplifying further, we can write:24
− 1
η
(1+ λi) = ∆Li,t · θi,t−1∆θi,t + Li,t. (15)
where θi,t−1∆θi,t is the inverse of the percentage change in firm i’s market share. Using αi,t to represent the
percentage change in firm i’s market share at time t, and dividing both sides of equation (15) by 1η , we can
21In fact, our analysis rests on the assumption that the price elasticity of demand is relatively constant over time. Alternatively, the
demand function may also be nonlinear. In that case, the marginal benefits from behaving competitively, undercutting competitors
and thereby causing a reallocation of profits, vary depending on the shift along the demand curve that results. However, although
this would alter the amount of reallocation, it will not affect our analysis otherwise.
22A similar type of decomposition is given in Stiroh (2000) and Stiroh and Strahan (2003).
23This line of thinking is similar to Caballero and Engel (1993). Note that we use total assets instead of total revenue, as shifts in
total revenue capture both changes in rents and changes in output.
24The complete derivation is available upon request from the authors.
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rearrange to write:25
λi,t = −
(
∆Li,t
αi,t
· η
)
− (Li,t · η)− 1. (16)
This expression for λi,t and its lags can be used in estimating equations (9a)-(9c). Also, it can be used to
test whether there is more collusion among firms with a market share at or above the critical mass. To do
so, we perform three types of tests. First, we test whether reallocation is zero for firms with market power
compared to firms without market power. Second, we test whether reallocation equals zero in markets
with firms that have market power versus markets that do not have firms with market power. Third, we
test whether reallocation is zero for firms with market power before and after they gained market power.
Test results are reported in Table 4 and described in Section 3.3.
In sum, we derived a Cournot model that enables identification of firms with market power and con-
struction of related market power measures.
2.4. Conjectural variation as an omitted variable
In Section 2.2, we proposed a Lerner index specification. In line with CW and CL, our specification of
the Lerner index in equation (6) includes conjectural variation, λi,t, as a covariate for the Lerner index, Li,t,
in order to capture the direct effects of changes in conjectural variation on firms’ markups. And, following
Stigler (1964), we need to take into account the role of market share, θi,t, as a moderator for the effect of
conjectural variation on the Lerner Index.26 It is straightforward to see that the specification in equation (6)
satisfies these conditions.
More formally, our specification in equation (6) results from reintroducing, λi,t, which has been treated
as an omitted variable in most related empirical competition tests, following CW and CL. As a result, exist-
ing literature on competition measurement using concentration (or market share) as a proxy suffers from
an omitted variable bias. As long as the market structure (or share) variable is biased in the correct way,
competition tests reach satisfactory inferences. To clarify this point, Table A.2 in the Appendix summarizes
three common specifications. For simplicity, control variables are ignored. In specification A, market share
is included to proxy for market power, and the dependent variable is the firm-level Lerner index.27 In
common specification B, the concentration measure, HHI, is included as a covariate to proxy for market
power, and the dependent variable is again the firm-level Lerner index.28 The last specification C is similar
to B, except that the dependent variable is the industry Lerner index, and the analysis is carried out at the
industry-level, as in Cowling (1976) and Cowling and Waterson (1976).
Table A.2 in the Appendix tracks the omitted variable bias for specifications A, B, and C. Starting with
the basic specifications in equations (A.1), (B.1), and (C.1), we can introduce λi,t, the omitted variable, as a
function of the market structure variable using an auxiliary function as shown in equations (A.2), (B.2), and
(C.2).29 In these conditioning equations, λi,t is assumed to have its own firm-specific effect γi and depends
(positively) on θi,t.30 Again introducing λi,t in equations (A.1) and (B.1), and reintroducing λt in equation
(C.1) results in equations (A.3), (B.3) and (C.3), respectively. We can now assess how accurately the proxies
in equations (A.1), (B.1), and (C.1) capture competition by evaluating the omitted variable bias in equations
(A.4), (B.4), and (C.4). Ideally, this bias should increase (decrease) with the level of collusion (competition).
25As should be expected, rewriting and rearranging equation (5) gives the same result.
26"[A] moderator is a qualitative (e.g., sex, race, class) or quantitative (e.g., level of reward) variable that affects the direction and/or
strength of the relation between an independent or predictor variable and a dependent or criterion variable" (Baron and Kenny, 1986,
p. 1174).
27See Bikker and Bos (2008), and others.
28See Berger (1995), Berger et al. (2004), Casu and Girardone (2006), Claessens and Laeven (2004), Gilbert (1984), Molyneux and
Forbes (1995), and many others.
29In specification C, in line with Cowling (1976) and Cowling and Waterson (1976), we use λt (the asset-weighted average), rather
than λi,t.
30In specification C, consistent with Cowling (1976) and Cowling and Waterson (1976), there is no firm-specific effect, and λt is a
function of HHIt.
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In specification A, when we estimate a firm-level specification using market share as a proxy for market
power, the bias depends on the covariance between θi,t and λit and the variance of θi,t. From Stigler (1964),
we know that the former is positive. The latter reflects the effect of entropy (see Acar and Sankaran, 1999)
– as the variance of the market share drops, and firms become more alike, the bias to β1 (i.e., the coefficient
for θi,t) from using market share as a proxy for competition increases. That is, we can expect to fairly
accurately assess the overall level of competition using market share as a proxy, as long as the proxy is
highly correlated with conjectural variation, and firms are very alike.
Similarly, with regard to specification C (see Cowling and Waterson, 1976), as long as market concen-
tration (HHI) is highly correlated with conjectural variation (i.e., indicated by the HHI coefficient γ1 in the
conditioning equation), the bias from using market concentration in an industry-level estimation has the
correct positive sign. Moreover, the bias increases the more significant this correlation is (as implied by a
low variance for γ1). Although aggregation effects may have (other) negative consequences, the empirical
test proposed in Cowling (1976) and Cowling and Waterson (1976) appears to work rather well as long as
firms behave alike, viz., when competition is either (close to) perfect, or (almost) absent.
The most interesting specification is B with market concentration included in a firm-level specification,
as is common practice in the literature. Equation (B.4) is clearly more complicated than the other spec-
ifications. The bias now depends on the covariance between market share (θi,t) and λi,t, the variance of
market share, and the market share itself. In fact, equation (B.4) tells us that market concentration works
particularly poorly as a proxy for competition in a firm-level specification when concentration is high. To
see why, consider the case where we increase the market share by a scaling parameter h.31 In that case,
Var [θi,t] increases by h2. For a given Cov [θi,t,λi,t], the bias therefore may drop sharply as the increase in
market share is sufficiently high. As we shall see in Section 3.4, the result is a high likelihood of both a Type
I and II errors when using concentration as a competition measure in this way.
In sum, by treating conjectural variation as an omitted variable and then reintroducing it in equation
(6), we can estimate the latter specification in a manner that is both consistent with Stigler (1964) and
avoids the fallacy of division. Section 3.5 presents empirical evidence of the bias that exists in U.S. banking
competition tests based on specification B.
3. Empirical results
A natural laboratory for examining the relationship between concentration and competition is the U.S.
banking industry. Over the last thirty years, historic consolidation has dramatically changed the structure
of the banking industry. Studies by Kane (2000), Stiroh and Strahan (2003), Berger et al. (1999), and others
document this process, its causes, and some of its potential consequences. There were 15,084 U.S. banking
and thrift institutions at year-end 1984 (Jones and Critchfield, 2004, p. 3), but by the end of 2003 the number
of institutions had shrank by 48% to 7,842. Numerous studies have sought to determine whether higher
bank concentration is detrimental to competition with mixed results. For example, Berger and Hannan
(1989) find a positive relationship between profitability and market concentration in retail banking markets
in the late 1980s. By contrast, Cole, Goldberg, and White (2004) report no evidence that differences in loan
approval procedures of large versus small banks had a negative effect on pricing and volume in the market
for small business lending. However, in tests of how competition in local banking markets affects the
market structure of nonfinancial sectors, Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) show that potential entrants faced
greater difficulty gaining access to credit in concentrated markets than in more competitive markets. Not
surprisingly, in most markets characterized by bank consolidation or high market concentration, fears of
anti-competitive behavior persist (i.e., more concentrated markets are expected to increase the likelihood
of collusion). Berger et al., 2004 provide an excellent survey of the voluminous empirical research on bank
market concentration and competition, which was intensely examined in the wake of Depression-era laws
31Of course, the sum of the market shares has to equal 1. In practice, the scaling parameter will therefore be negative or zero
for some firms. As we are interested in the case where the average market share increases over time, we can ignore this additional
constraint, as the average effect is measured in equation (B.4).
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and regulations that were implemented to recover from massive bank failures in the 1920s and 1930s and
promote a smooth functioning financial system.
This section applies our competition model to the U.S. banking industry. After describing the data
and estimating our competition indicators, we investigate a number of questions concerning relationships
between critical mass and collusion, concentration, rents, and bank deregulation. In general, our results
agree with studies that find market concentration constitutes a poor measure of competition (Gilbert and
Zaretsky, 2003; Claessens and Laeven, 2004) and, therefore, suffers from a fallacy of division.
3.1. Data
Our data include all insured U.S. commercial banks in the period 1984-2004. We collect year-end Call
Report balance sheet and income statement data for individual banks in each state for the period 1984-2004.
Empirical tests are conducted on the state level, as most policy decisions involving market concentration
measures occur on the state level, evidence supports state-wide pricing (Radecki, 1998; Heitfield, 1999), and
studies have found that state-level competition matters more than local competition (Hannan and Prager,
2004; Heitfield and Prager, 2004).32 As shown by the solid line in Figure 1, state level market concentration
measured by HHI rose considerably during the period under consideration. At the same time the dashed
line shows that the number of banks was almost halved.
Figure 1: Consolidation in U.S. banking
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Fractional polynomial fits using state−level data.
Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics for our variables. Markup is calculated as the sum of profit
before tax and fixed asset expenditures over total revenues. Market share is based on total assets, and
conjectural variation is calculated via equation (16) using the markup, market share, and market price elas-
ticity of demand. Following empirical methods in Teles and Zhou (2005), we estimated the latter elasticity
to be -0.15.33 In the sample period 1984-2004, the average markup Li,t was close to 16%, the average market
share was 0.5%, and average conjectural variation was -0.943.
When estimating equations (9a)-(9c), consistent with previous literature (Bikker and Bos, 2008), we uti-
lize control variables. To take into account differences in risk-taking, we include the ratio of total loans and
leases over total assets as a proxy for credit risk exposure. We also include earning assets measured as the
32Of course, banks can compete on local, state, and national levels to various degrees (e.g., see Gilbert and Zaretsky, 2003).
33Teles and Zhou (2005) proxy the market price elasticity of demand with the interest elasticity of money demand. The real money
demand function is estimated for our sample period. The dependent variable is the deflated MZM money aggregate (i.e., M2 less
small time deposits plus institutional money market funds), and the independent variables are GDP and interest rate (i.e., the federal
funds rate minus the MZM own rate). The first derivative of this specification and one-period lagged dependent variable is used to
adjust for serial correlation. Based on this model, we estimate the interest elasticity of money to be -0.15, which is close to the -0.20
estimate obtained by Teles and Zhou (2005, p. 57) in the similar sample period 1980-2003.
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ratio of total assets minus fixed assets over total assets.34 The ratio of noninterest expenses over noninterest
income is used to control for costs, rather than the ratio of total expenses over total income, as year-to-year
changes in interest earnings and expenses may reflect yield curve changes instead of banks’ cost manage-
ment.35 Finally, to control for the fact that market shares as well as markups may reflect differences in
efficiency (i.e., the so-called efficiency hypothesis (Goldberg and Rai, 1996)), we include cost efficiency es-
timates based on standard translog cost frontier methods (see Bos and Kolari (2005) and citations therein).
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
markup (Li,t) 0.159 0.225
market share (θi,t) 0.005 0.026
conjectural variation (λi,t) 1.000 0.021
risk (loans and leases/total assets) 0.557 0.152
earning assets (total assets - fixed assets)/total assets) 0.983 0.013
cost (noninterest expenses/noninterest income) 5.778 9.795
cost efficiency (translog cost frontier estimates) 0.791 0.096
The total number of observations based on the specification in equation (9a) is 200,488. The p-value for the
one-sided t-test that λi,t > 1 (<) equals 0.828 (1.000). Annual cost efficiency estimates were obtained from Bos
and Kolari (2005), who employed a translog cost function to obtain estimates.
With the exception of the cost ratio, the standard deviations of the control variables are relatively low.
This low variability may (in part) explain why later empirical results suggest that control variables play a
minor role. In order to test whether our assumption holds that differences in markup are not attributed to
differences in the control variables, we identify banks with and without market power and run a canonical
linear discriminant analysis using all four control variables. Results show that the probability of correctly
classifying a bank with (without) market power based on the control variables is 60.06% (56.10%), confirm-
ing that the control variables indeed are not driving our results.
Another reason for this result is that our model is grounded in an identity and controls for firm-level
heterogeneity either through fixed effects using equation (9a) or dynamic panel estimators using equations
(9b) and (9c).
3.2. Main empirical results
Table 3 summarizes our competition measures for states in which there is evidence of collusion. Endo-
geneity appears to be less of an issue than was originally believed. Although we find evidence of collusion
in 30 states, tests indicate that instrumenting is required in only 12 states, and estimating specification (9c)
was never warranted. For illustrative purposes, Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the esti-
mation results for California. The graph shows the marginal effect of a change in conjectural variation on
the markup conditional on market share. Since our model posits that collusion results in a marginal effect
equal or greater than zero, we can infer from the results in Figure 2 that collusion exists in California. As
shown in Table 3, we estimate California’s critical mass θ∗i,t to gain market power at slightly more than
6 percent. Other results in the table indicate that on average less than 1 percent of California banks had
market power. Note that collusion first occurs in 1989 when state-level HHI was a modest 1,074. Also,
approximately three banks had market power and earned rents averaging almost 58 percent of the total
markup.
Our results for California aptly demonstrate the fallacy of division. Although the market is moderately
concentrated, there is collusion among a very small number of banks. In effect, according to our results, this
34Additionally, we tested the leverage ratio equal to total equity over total assets with little change in results.
35In unreported results, the inclusion of total expenses over total revenues did not alter our conclusions.
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Table 3: Empirical results for states with market power
Critical
mass
Banks
with
market
power
(%)
First
year
with
mar-
ket
power
HHI
in first
year
with
market
power
Marginal
effect of
change
in mar-
ket
share
Markup
due to
market
power
(%)
Profits
due to
market
power
Average
number
of banks
with θ∗
Instru-
ment
test
(p-
value)
Specifi-
cation
State θ∗ %∗ year∗ HHI∗ m f x∗ rents bonus n∗ endog. spec.
Alabama 1.73*** 2.60 1984 571.79 2.49 24.97 227141.30 5.13 eq (9a)
Alaska 44.21*** 11.01 1989 3325.73 1.61 13.74 14936.30 0.44 eq (9a)
California 6.06*** 0.72 1989 1074.26 1.35 57.80 3088269.00 3.06 eq (9a)
Colorado 0.47*** 15.15 1984 234.77 8.42 9.34 1225.39 43.98 eq (9a)
Dist. of Columbia 0.00*** 100.00 1984 2403.24 17.76 eq (9a)
Florida 0.22*** 21.39 1984 364.69 13.93 84.29 76863.87 69.44 0.04** eq. (9b)
Georgia 5.88*** 0.66 1984 723.39 18.51 94.55 1354554.00 2.45 0.00*** eq. (9b)
Hawaii 0.00*** 100.00 1984 2767.40 17.30 eq (9a)
Idaho 8.11*** 41.27 2001 895.53 2.36 15.46 13126.19 4.00 0.06* eq. (9b)
Illinois 1.99*** 0.83 1998 888.39 1.97 20.94 304911.60 5.41 eq (9a)
Indiana 1.19*** 5.49 1984 209.35 0.27 21.04 42393.09 13.36 eq (9a)
Iowa 0.18*** 28.64 1984 51.57 0.50 9.33 683.41 144.67 eq (9a)
Kansas 13.44*** 0.09 1991 259.36 84.92 102.75 406087.40 0.24 0.00*** eq. (9b)
Missouri 0.46*** 8.98 2000 395.28 0.57 16.18 12531.79 27.48 eq (9a)
Montana 1.82*** 8.40 1984 149.95 0.97 32.13 9531.43 9.93 eq (9a)
New Mexico 18.23*** 0.91 1985 466.91 39.92 69.63 153705.10 0.61 0.02** eq. (9b)
New York 0.02*** 59.41 1990 1021.53 0.01 7.83 18723.18 96.02 eq (9a)
Oklahoma 1.00*** 4.12 1994 300.15 41.05 97.61 97043.93 10.38 0.00*** eq. (9b)
Oregon 0.00*** 100.00 1984 2751.76 47.67 0.03** eq. (9b)
Pennsylvania 0.00*** 100.00 1984 620.41 254.98 0.00*** eq. (9b)
South Carolina 5.96*** 5.22 1995 1372.66 1.46 30.63 82510.63 3.48 eq (9a)
South Dakota 19.05*** 1.88 2003 2019.01 5.25 76.75 994524.40 1.10 0.00*** eq. (9b)
Tennessee 1.07*** 3.07 1994 627.30 1.10 19.58 62170.29 9.63 eq (9a)
Utah 21.05*** 3.31 1984 1589.84 1.45 23.06 158612.10 1.62 eq (9a)
Virginia 0.06*** 88.42 1984 1162.51 0.15 28.03 7560.33 138.11 eq (9a)
Washington 0.58*** 27.27 1984 1710.37 0.38 19.19 10362.43 22.58 eq (9a)
West Virginia 0.00*** 100.00 1984 101.41 160.01 0.01*** eq. (9b)
Wisconsin 2.89*** 0.81 1986 118.88 43.33 101.87 458235.20 2.96 0.00*** eq. (9b)
Results are based on the preferred specification denoted in the last column. Significance is indicated at the following levels: 1/5/10%
(***/**/*, respectively).
market’s relevant concentration measure is a C3 ratio. Even though rents for these top 3 banks are sizeable,
our results suggest that the label collusive does not fit most banks operating in the California market.
The estimated competition metrics in Table 3 reveal that, among the states in which there is evidence of
collusion, the HHI at which collusion begins differs widely. In Arkansas, Iowa, Montana, Oklahoma, and
West Virginia, this minimum HHI is always less than 150. By contrast, in Alaska, the District of Columbia,
Hawaii, and Oregon, the minimum HHI is always above 2,500. Consequently, HHI as a measure of com-
petition appears to be seriously flawed. This problem is further illustrated by the critical mass required to
have market power, which ranges from 44.21 percent in Alaska to 0 percent in Pennsylvania. The use of
other market concentration measures, such as a C5 or C10 ratio, appears to be subject to question also, as
the average number of banks with market power ranges (for example) from less than 1 in South Dakota
to more than 269 in Kentucky. Likewise, rents widely range from a modest 7.49 percent in Mississippi to
slightly more than 100 percent in Arkansas, Kansas, and Wisconsin.36 The first year in which collusion
36Results for New Mexico are suspect due to estimated rents of -252.03 percent, or a negative dollar bonus.
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Figure 2: Conditional marginal effect of conjectural variation on the markup in California
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started has a fair range too. In 20 out of 30 states, collusion already existed in the 1980s, often from the be-
ginning of our sample period. The last year in which collusion started is 2004, when banks in New Mexico
reached their critical mass.
In an effort to verify these results, we estimated specifications (9a)-(9c) for four separate periods: 1984-
1988, 1989-1993, 1994-1998 and 1999-2004. Table A.1 in the Appendix reports the results for states and
periods in which there is evidence of collusion. For the states included in Table 3, the results are generally
robust when compared to Table A.1. However, the latter table also includes a number of other states in
which there is evidence of collusion in one or more of the four periods. In the remainder of this section, we
focus on the main results in Table 3, except when the distinction between periods is crucial, as in the case
of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.
In sum, although there is substantial evidence of collusion at the state level in U.S. banking, the extent
to which banks colluded, the rents they earned from colluding and, importantly, the level of concentration
at which collusion started for (a subset of) banks varied widely across states. These results confirm the
dangers of using market concentration as a singular measure of competition.
3.3. Does collusion increase above the critical mass?
In section 2.3.2 we distinguished between banks that operate with and without market power and
proposed three related hypotheses. Table 4 contains the test results for these hypotheses.37
The first and most direct market power test compares banks with market power to banks without mar-
ket power. Our results confirm that the reallocation effect in equation (14) equals zero for banks with
market power but not for banks without market power. The second test of whether the reallocation effect
equals zero in states where banks have market power versus states where no banks have market power
yields similar results. The third, and last, test of whether the reallocation effect equals zero in states where
banks have market power before and after the first year in which at least one bank gained market power
again yields similar results. Together, these test results suggest that collusion does increase above the criti-
cal market share. In this regard, collusion can take place among a select number of firms in a market. Also,
banks that are too small and do not collude experience a markup change due to reallocation effects (as
banks gain market share at the expense of other firms with higher markups).38
37In addition to the tests reported in Table 4, we performed unreported tests. First, non-parametric rank tests yielded qualitatively
identical results. Second, we scaled the reallocation effects by the size of the banks, which also did not change the results. In our
opinion the reported results constitute a strong test of our hypothesis, as scaling especially reduces the reallocation effects of large
banks.
38The implication here is a negative reallocation effect.
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Table 4: More collusion results in less reallocation
Tests Null hypothesis p-value Result
Banks with market power
versus
banks without market power
reallocation(θi,t≥θ∗i,t) = 0 0.506 accept
reallocation(θi,t≥θ∗i,t = 0 0.002 reject
States with market power
versus
states without market power
reallocation(year≥year∗) = 0 0.436 accept
reallocation(year<year∗) = 0 0.000 reject
Banks with market power before year∗
versus
after year∗
reallocation(year≥year∗)|year∗ 6=. = 0 0.334 accept
reallocation(year<year∗)|year∗ 6=. = 0 0.017 reject
All p-values are based on two-sided t-tests with a critical value of 5%.
3.4. Additional empirical results
In this section we further investigate relationships between concentration measures and market power
(competition) metrics by means of graphical and empirical analyses.
3.4.1. Is there more collusion when the market is more concentrated?
Implicit in HHI as a measure of competition is the idea that there is a higher probability of collusion
when a market is more concentrated. Our model makes clear that this assertion may be flawed. Although
the probability of collusion increases in our model with higher HHI, it does not necessarily imply that the
number (or percentage) of banks colluding increases. Additionally, because a higher HHI often implies
fewer banks, endogeneity may be an issue. As the results in Table 4 show, this does not necessarily mean
that all remaining banks in a market collude. By way of illustration, Figure 3a compares the percentage of
banks with market power (%∗) with the HHI in the first year in which there was market power (HHI∗). To
simplify the graphical analysis, the sample is restricted to states in which %∗ was at least 5 percent.
If the intuition for HHI as a measure of competition is correct, we expect to see a higher percentage
of banks with market power in states with higher HHIs. However, the results shown in Figure 3a do not
support this relation, as casual inspection suggests a slightly negative association between market power
and HHI.
Certainly the number of observations in Figure 3a is low, and the results may be affected by the fact
that we only consider the first year in which there is collusion. For these reasons a more formal analysis is
provided in the first part of Table 5. Using the results in Table A.1, we regress the percentage of banks with
market power on HHI. Again we find no positive relationship between these variables, which contradicts
the intuition underlying HHI as a competition measure. Consequently, an important potential pitfall is
Type I error in terms of ignoring collusion in markets with low concentration.
3.4.2. Is the critical mass lower in more concentrated markets?
As noted in the introduction, mergers are more likely to be approved in markets with lower concentra-
tion. Our results so far raise serious questions about this practice, as many states have low concentration
levels but exhibit low critical mass. As such, there is the possibility of a Type II error by authorities in terms
of approving a merger even though it leads to (or reaffirms) market power.
An important caveat is that, consistent with the Lucas critique, a merger may alter the market dynamics.
To partially address this concern, consider the relationship in Figure 3b between critical mass and HHI in
the first year in which there is market power. This relationship appears to be positive. For the states
shown there, based on casual observation of the marginal effects of increases in market share on markup,
an increase in market share (e.g., due to a merger) tended to have a much larger effect in less concentrated
markets. This relation is confirmed by the regression results in Table 5, in which a positive estimated
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Figure 3: The fallacy of division
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(b) Is the critical mass lower in more concentrated markets?
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(c) Are there (more) rents for banks in more concentrated mar-
kets?
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(d) Has competition increased after the IBBEA of 1994?
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coefficient is found when critical market shares are regressed on HHI. Once again, there is a risk of Type II
errors, as authorities may be inclined to wrongly approve mergers in states with low concentration, even
though the merger may result in significant market power.
3.4.3. Do banks in more concentrated markets earn higher rents?
The extent to which regulatory authorities contemplate Type I and II errors in assessing the level of
competition depends on how market power affects consumers. As noted earlier, some market power may
foster financial innovation and stability. Therefore, it is important to know the extent to which market
power enables firms to capture rents. Figure 3c shows the relationship between our rough measure of rents
earned by banks with market power and HHI. The overall pattern of the data is disconcerting, as banks
with high rents appear to operate in markets with low concentration.39 However, results from regressing
rents on HHI in Table 5 do not suggest a significant relationship between these two variables. We infer that
market concentration likely has little effect in terms of enabling those with market power to earn rents.
39Based on Table 4, these results may reflect the low number of observations for banks with market power to some degree.
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Table 5: Regressions of market power measures on HHI in states
Is there more collusion when the market is more concentrated?
HHI Constant N
%∗ 0.004 (0.83) 43.853 (6.17)** 95
Is the critical mass lower in more concentrated markets?
HHI Constant N
θ∗i,t 0.002 (2.54)* -0.268 (0.19) 95
Do banks in more concentrated markets earn higher rents?
HHI Constant N
rents 0.014 (1.53) 9.738 (0.62) 67
Estimations for the first and second question are based on a Tobit regression
model with upper (100) and lower (0) limits. Estimations for the third question
are based on a standard regression model. All estimations utilize estimated
results from Table A.1.
3.4.4. Has competition increased after the IBBEA of 1994?
In order to stimulate competition, legal and regulatory changes aimed at lowering entry barriers, re-
moving geographic barriers, lowering costs, and enabling innovation have been periodically implemented
in the U.S. banking industry. A major legislative change in our sample period took place in 1994 when
the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) was passed by the U.S. Congress. This Act
sought to significantly enhance competition by allowing banks to compete across state borders. In view
of major restructuring in the banking industry due to this legislation, as a final assessment of the level of
competition in U.S. banking, we briefly examine the impact of the IBBEA.
Table 6: Competition before and after the 1994 IBBEA
States with collusion before 37
States with collusion after 36
States with collusion before and after 26
States with collusion only before 11
States with collusion only after 10
Based on estimates per period provided in Table A.1.
Dividing our sample data into the subperiods 1984-1993 and 1994-2004, Figure 3d summarizes different
aspects of collusion before and after the IBBEA. The critical mass required to have market power increased
from an average of about 4 percent to about 6.5 percent. However, due to increases in concentration, the
percentage of banks with market power (in states where there is collusion) did not change. Also, average
rents earned decreased by almost 4 percentage points. Table 6 provides further information (based on Table
A.1.). The number of states with collusion stayed almost constant before and after IBBEA. Although there
were 11 states with collusion only before interstate banking deregulation, 10 states experienced collusion
only after the IBBEA was implemented. Thus, we infer that, while the IBBEA had mixed effects on bank
competition across states, on average competition was not generally affected on the state level.
3.5. How important is omitted variable bias?
In Section 2.4 and Table A.2, we analyzed the bias that exists when conjectural variation is omitted
from Cournot-type competition tests. The theoretical evidence presented there demonstrated that the most
serious bias exists when we relate firm-level performance (i.e., the Lerner index) to market concentration
(i.e., the HHI). In the latter case, a combination of omitted variable bias and aggregation bias means that
HHI is a particularly poor proxy for the level of collusion when it is sufficiently high. But what is sufficient
in the context of our empirical analysis?
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We next provide an empirical answer to this question by relating HHI to the percentage of firms with
market power, %∗. As a further robustness test, we relate HHI to the percentage of the bank assets held
by banks with market power. For each of these measures, we run a kernel regression, where HHI is the
explanatory variable. The intuition is that, as long as collusion increases with HHI, the conditional densities
for our measures that result from the kernel regression should follow a positive relationship. Once this
positive relationship no longer holds, as described in Section 2.4, market concentration becomes a poor
proxy for competition in a firm-level specification.
Figure 4: Omitted variable bias and the HHI
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Figures 4a and 4b show the predicted percentages of firms (assets) with market power as HHI increases.
In line with equation (B.4) in Table A.2, market concentration works particularly poorly as a proxy for
competition in a firm-level specification when concentration is high. Initially, as HHI increases so does our
market power measure, from an HHI of 0 to about 2000. Then an inverse relation between HHI and market
power is observed as HHI exceeds 2000, even though at higher HHIs we are supposed to observe more
collusion. Paradoxically, HHI is weakest when we need to rely on it the most for information about market
power.
4. Conclusion
Competition tests based on market concentration measures, such as the popular Hirschman-Herfindahl
Index (HHI), assume either perfect competition or perfect collusion and, therefore, are prone to a fallacy of
division. In the real world there is a continuum between these extreme endpoints that encompasses many
competitive market conditions. Extending previous work by Cowling and Waterson (1976) and Cowling
(1976), we relax this restrictive assumption by assuming that Cournot-type collusive rents can be earned by
all, none, or some of the firms in a market. We propose that a firm’s markup (or Lerner index) is a function
of its market share, conjectural variation (or reaction of rivals to a change in a firm’s output), and their
interaction. The proposed model allows estimation of how large a firm must be to achieve critical mass as
a collusive oligopolist. Using critical mass, the percentage of firms with market power can be estimated.
Other potentially valuable market power metrics are the first year in which at least one firm gained market
power, the marginal effect on markup of an increase in market share, percentage of the markup due to
market power, and the dollar value of profits due to rents of colluding firms.
Empirical specifications of the model are developed that take into account the possibility of endogene-
ity as well as a new measure of conjectural variation. We applied the model to data for U.S. commercial
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banks at the state level in the period 1984-2004. In general, our results do not support concentration as a
singular measure of competition. While we found considerable evidence of collusion at the state level, the
extent of collusion, rents earned from collusion, and collusive concentration levels varied widely across
states. Even when some banks had market power in a state, it was rarely the case that collusion was per-
fect among all banks in the state. Instead, large banks in some states colluded. Moreover, reliance on
concentration as a measure of competition results in both Type I and II errors, as there were both states
with high-concentration/high-competition levels and states with low-concentration/low-competition lev-
els. Consistent with our model, we found more collusion among banks with market shares beyond the
critical mass required in a state. However, there was no clear time pattern as to when a state reaches the
critical mass. Compared to less concentrated markets, more concentrated markets did not exhibit more
collusion, tended to have larger critical mass, and were not more likely to earn collusive rents. Lastly,
interstate banking deregulation did not have major competitive effects on the banking industry.
A number of previous studies address weaknesses in concentration as a competition proxy. We con-
tribute to this literature by proposing a Cournot model solution that traces its roots back to the original,
and frequently misinterpreted, work of Cowling and Waterson (1976) and Cowling (1976). In addition,
we suggest a way of validating our proposed alternative critical mass competition measures. Lastly, we
demonstrate, both theoretically and empirically, that HHI is a particularly poor proxy for competition when
we need to rely on it the most.
We conclude that critical mass is a promising new market power metric for competition analyses. It con-
stitutes a more robust measure of market power than HHI that incorporates added information about the
degree of competition. As such, it is more general than concentration measures, which are are only accurate
in the extreme cases of perfect competition and perfect collusion, rather than more realistic intermediate
levels of competition. An important policy implication is that the U.S. Department of Justice, regulatory
agencies, and similar authorities in other countries should supplement HHI concentration guidelines with
information on critical mass and related market power metrics. In this way a more complete picture of
market competition and collusion can be obtained in merger analyses and decisions. Finally, our new
competition measures open up a number of new avenues for possible future study. For example, further
research is recommended with respect to critical mass analyses of other industries, definition of the rel-
evant market, validity of Cournot-type competition models, and other economics applications of critical
mass.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Robustness results for the subperiods 1984-1988, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, and 1999-2004
State θ∗ %∗ year∗ HHI∗ m f x∗ rents dollar bonus n∗ period
Alabama 1.34*** 3.13 1984 571.79 2.87 -70.08 -166163.9 7.49 1984-1988
Alabama 0.73*** 6.8 1989 918.37 0.32 -50.34 -101180.6 14.8 1989-1993
Alabama 0.25*** 9.39 1999 1890.19 0.48 2.87 -22525.63 14.49 1999-2004
Alaska 27.66*** 19.44 1994 2911.01 3.17 9.22 3937.05 1.33 1994-1998
Arizona 0.41*** 41.6 1999 4598.03 15.41 16.84 14575.49 17.38 1999-2004
Arkansas 0.57*** 18.54 1994 135.43 11.39 -6.45 -3051.67 42.46 1994-1998
California 0*** 100 1989 1074.26 458.1 1989-1993
California 49.28*** 0.17 1994 2676.25 0.68 177.82 29400000 0.59 1994-1998
California 0.12*** 36.64 2004 585.56 4.62 11.04 14989.78 77.73 1999-2004
Colorado 0.46*** 10.17 1984 234.77 3.52 57.59 11643.14 43.42 1984-1988
Colorado 0.25*** 24.95 1989 276.37 88.09 15.06 1521.58 93.89 1989-1993
Colorado 0*** 100 1994 318.5 224.53 1994-1998
Connecticut 6.52*** 8.22 1984 1828.37 0.64 -27.16 -154322.1 4.8 1984-1988
Connecticut 14.53*** 3.03 2001 722.22 19.3 347.37 1368991 0.5 1999-2004
Delaware 6.24*** 40.48 1984 1564.34 14.25 31.59 52180.86 6.77 1984-1988
Dist of Columbia 3.31*** 27.45 1984 2403.24 0.28 571.73 1304417 5.63 1984-1988
Dist of Columbia 0*** 100 1989 2140.34 21.5 1989-1993
Florida 0*** 100 1984 364.69 402 1984-1988
Florida 0.02*** 86.95 1989 372.59 0.5 345.05 1989-1993
Florida 0.06*** 88.7 1999 295.62 0.65 231.43 1999-2004
Georgia 0.13*** 48.91 1997 916.31 0.43 1.97 -1201.19 113.99 1994-1998
Georgia 3.46*** 0.41 1999 1219.29 12.53 41.45 1856726 1.34 1999-2004
Hawaii 0*** 100 1989 3166.74 19.38 1989-1993
Hawaii 25.72*** 26.67 1999 4038.03 0.41 -169.2 -1266790 2 1999-2004
Idaho 4.4*** 16.67 1984 2326.83 114.61 96.38 142775.9 4 1984-1988
Idaho 52.37*** 0 0 1989-1993
Illinois 0*** 100 1984 678.95 1204.26 1984-1988
Illinois 0*** 100 1989 674.91 1036.87 1989-1993
Indiana 0.23*** 26.86 1984 209.35 0.9 -2.51 -2285.19 95.06 1984-1988
Indiana 0*** 100 1989 196.98 279.54 1989-1993
Indiana 0.43*** 20.91 1994 504.18 1.13 12.97 7316.91 40.9 1994-1998
Indiana 0*** 100 1999 921.53 150.72 1999-2004
Iowa 0.05*** 88.37 1994 53.82 3.64 414.85 1994-1998
Iowa 0.02*** 99.23 1999 279.35 9.25 408.83 1999-2004
Kansas 0.19*** 26.83 1991 259.36 0.84 -0.11 -505.09 138.39 1989-1993
Kansas 0.19*** 31.62 1994 381.22 1.86 -1.48 -847.35 131.71 1994-1998
Kansas 0.5*** 10.08 1999 242.84 3.86 6.43 320.4 36.9 1999-2004
Kentucky 0.54*** 14.15 2003 462.81 3.93 35.17 25937.82 25.14 1999-2004
Louisiana 0.53*** 10.92 1984 175.18 -64.98 -41847.2 30.61 1984-1988
Louisiana 0*** 100 1989 669.93 222.55 1989-1993
Louisiana 0.65*** 9.75 1994 640.56 3.64 -2.74 -12214.73 16.96 1994-1998
Maine 19.66*** 6.98 1985 1177.67 0.03 -0.45 -10027.47 1.09 1984-1988
Maine 87.09*** 0 0 1999-2004
Massachusetts 0*** 100 1984 1230.37 110.78 1984-1988
Michigan 0*** 100 1985 629.95 325.59 1984-1988
Michigan 0*** 100 1999 1285.63 162.22 1999-2004
Minnesota 0*** 100 1999 2029.77 476.11 1999-2004
Mississippi 0.3*** 48.36 1989 748.07 258.61 -26.13 -9528.83 58.79 1989-1993
Missouri 3.25*** 0.92 1986 236.08 0.97 4.89 -1164.73 4.28 1984-1988
Missouri 0.15*** 19.85 1994 423.85 1.09 1.16 -1880.94 84.34 1994-1998
Continued on next page ...
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Table A.1 (Continued from previous page)
State θ∗ %∗ year∗ HHI∗ m f x∗ rents dollar bonus n∗ period
Missouri 0.18*** 26.96 2001 434.45 0.34 10.7 2398.52 89.53 1999-2004
Montana 0.44*** 52.25 1991 171.42 7.51 12.92 655.94 63.07 1989-1993
Montana 2.8*** 4.63 1994 301.88 6.09 -13.53 -12786.46 4.6 1994-1998
Montana 22.14*** 1.27 2001 847.07 0.31 57.89 127116.5 0.65 1999-2004
Nebraska 3.28*** 0.7 1989 252.53 8.79 -25.58 -38972.15 2.6 1989-1993
Nebraska 0.81*** 7.65 1999 207.77 4.53 7.1 708.95 20.15 1999-2004
Nevada 2.19*** 23.75 1999 2600.93 1.41 2.22 -1841.65 6.51 1999-2004
New Hampshire 0*** 100 1984 391.69 54.84 1984-1988
New Hampshire 4.04*** 38.24 2000 4312.38 8.15 20.4 11615.03 4.65 1999-2004
New Jersey 0*** 100 1994 766.48 76.26 1994-1998
New Jersey 0*** 100 1999 1587.46 78.95 1999-2004
New Mexico 0.49*** 59.52 1985 466.91 1.49 43.91 5351.25 56.01 1984-1988
New Mexico 2.34*** 7.94 1989 538.51 0.69 -67.74 -47523.98 6.79 1989-1993
New Mexico 0.52*** 60 1997 879.3 7.17 28.28 5799.18 39.3 1994-1998
New York 0*** 100 1984 1082.75 192.82 1984-1988
North Carolina 1*** 11.78 1989 1717.66 35.46 35.39 238042.9 9 1989-1993
North Dakota 1.02*** 12.22 1984 122.08 40.9 -0.81 -763.02 21.12 1984-1988
North Dakota 0.16*** 86.42 1999 394.81 1.32 5.36 46.02 90.42 1999-2004
Ohio 0.06*** 47.25 1994 701.1 0.18 114.54 1994-1998
Oklahoma 0.35*** 13.01 1992 181.69 1.33 18.11 3395.75 50.25 1989-1993
Oklahoma 8.92*** 0.52 1996 374.18 0.67 16.17 43036.85 1.39 1994-1998
Oregon 0*** 100 1989 3062.33 45.99 1989-1993
Oregon 0.87*** 43.18 1999 716.36 5.39 22.94 12667.51 16.22 1999-2004
Pennsylvania 1.8*** 3.29 1989 472.97 47.57 43.36 378414.7 9.38 1989-1993
Pennsylvania 0.06*** 61.1 1994 1115.12 0.24 134.19 1994-1998
Rhode Island 12.58*** 15 1984 4660.74 197 32.89 147552.2 1.78 1984-1988
Rhode Island 0*** 100 1989 4098.08 10.93 1989-1993
Rhode Island 0.16*** 91.43 1994 5857.59 35.07 165.84 518790.1 6.49 1994-1998
South Dakota 2.15*** 3.33 1987 838.17 0.75 23.33 14299.1 4 1984-1988
South Dakota 5.86*** 0.88 1989 1045.58 6.41 117.4 248054 1 1989-1993
South Dakota 0.4*** 41.18 1994 1700.23 0.89 -7.88 -2392.78 42.26 1994-1998
South Dakota 0*** 100 1999 2326.59 83.28 1999-2004
Tennessee 11.22*** 0.35 1984 400.97 0.04 37.26 167580.9 1 1984-1988
Tennessee 0.17*** 27.97 1999 1766.69 0.28 5.33 -466.05 53.88 1999-2004
Texas 0.03*** 40.71 1994 692.22 0.48 360.06 1994-1998
Texas 0.16*** 15.2 2001 312.37 32.59 12.92 5499.5 89.5 1999-2004
Utah 26.16*** 2.24 1985 1659.08 0.43 83.34 224403.5 1.2 1984-1988
Utah 5.44*** 7.43 1994 2009.21 26.05 -15.8 -94304.52 2.96 1994-1998
Utah 39.44*** 1.95 1999 2513.3 11.13 41.2 883668.8 1 1999-2004
Vermont 8.06*** 19.38 1984 1038.7 0.27 17.44 7657.46 5 1984-1988
Vermont 1.01*** 86.54 1994 1149.8 0.78 5.12 -158.48 18.02 1994-1998
Virginia 0.32*** 16.77 1984 1162.51 0.7 0.33 -5245.88 28.38 1984-1988
Virginia 0.45*** 11.43 1989 1292.42 0.6 -10.8 -31761.7 19.36 1989-1993
Washington 7.05*** 4.09 1984 1710.37 30.11 35.2 101090.6 3.81 1984-1988
Washington 15.14*** 2.22 1994 1514.19 2.98 19.76 101803.8 1.84 1994-1998
Washington 0.58*** 44.8 1999 433.39 0.43 -4.2 -4059.43 35.17 1999-2004
West Virginia 0.44*** 31.14 1984 101.41 0.58 -16.45 -2939.14 66.21 1984-1988
Results are based on the preferred specification among equations (9a)(9c) as discussed in the text. Also, results are reported for
only states and sub-periods in which evidence of collusion is obtained. Significance is indicated at the following levels: 1/5/10%
(***/**/*, respectively).
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Table A.2: Omitted variable bias
[A] Li,t, θi,t [B] Li,t, HHIt [C ] Lt, HHIt (Cowling and Waterson, 1976)
Li,t = βi + β1θi,t + ei,t (A.1) Li,t = βi + β1HHIt + ei,t (B.1) Lt = β0 + β1HHIt + et (C.1)
• Include market share (θi,t) as a proxy for market
power;
• Firm-level markup.
• Include the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) as a proxy for market power;
• Firm-level markup.
• Include the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) as a
proxy for market power;
• Industry-level markup.
λi,t = γi + γ1θi,t + wi,t (A.2)
λi,t =
γ
θi,t
+
γ1
θi,t
HHIt −
∑Nj=1 θj,tλj,t
θi,t
+ wi,t, j 6= i (B.2)
λt = γ+ γ1HHIt +ωt (C.2)
• λi,t is a function of θi,t in an auxiliary regression;
• λi,t is also a function of a firm-specific effect γi.
• λi,t is a function of θi,t in an auxiliary regression: λi,t = γi + γ1θi,t +ωi,t;
• λi,t is also a function of a firm-specific effect γi
• Multiplying both sides with θi,t, and aggregating across all firms, we arrive
at: θi,tλi,t +∑Nj=1 θj,tλj,t = γ+ γ1HHIt + wi,t, j 6= i
• Rearranging to solve for λi,t gives equation (B.2).
• λt is a function of HHIt in an auxiliary regression;
• λt can be a function of an industry-specific effect (not
here).
Li,t = [βi + β2γi] +
[
(β1 + γ1β2)θi,t
]
+
[
β2wi,t + ei,t
]
(A.3) Li,t =
[
βi + β2
γ
θi,t
]
+
[(
β1 + β2
γ1
θi,t
)
HHIt
]
− β2
∑Nj=1 θj,tλj,t
θi,t
+
[
β2wi,t + ei,t
]
(B.3)
Lt = [β0 + β2γ] + [(β1 + β2γ1) HHIt] + [β2wt + et] (C.3)
• Equation (A.1) after introducing λi,t using equation
(A.2).
• Equation (B.1) after introducing λi,t using equation (B.2). • Equation (C.1) after introducing λi,t using equation
(C.2).
E(βˆ1) = β1 + β2γ1 = β1 + β2
[
Cov
[
θi,t,λi,t
]
Var
[
θi,t
] ] (A.4) E(βˆ1) = β1 + β2
[
γ1
θi,t
]
= β1 + β2
[ Cov[θi,t ,λi,t ]
Var[θi,t ]
θi,t
]
(B.4)
E(βˆ1) = β1 + β2γ1 = β1 + β2
[
Cov[HHIt,λt]
Var[HHIt]
]
(C.4)
• Coefficient for θi,t;
• Cov
[
θi,t,λi,t
]
> 0 from Stigler (1964) and Section 2.2;
• The higher Var [θ], the less likely collusion is;
• β2 is (expected to be) positive and increasing in the
amount of collusion, based on Cowling (1976) and
Cowling and Waterson (1976).
• Coefficient for HHIt;
• Cov
[
θi,t,λi,t
]
> 0;
• For a given Cov
[
θi,t,λi,t
]
> 0, as θi,t increases by h, Var[θi,t] increases by h2;
• So the size of β2 is uncertain, but likely to drop quickly in highly concen-
trated markets.
• Coefficient for HHIt;
• Cov [HHIt,λt] > 0 from Stigler (1964) and Section
2.2;
• The Var [HHIt] is expected to be relatively small, ex-
cept (perhaps) across industries;
• β2 is (expected to be) positive, based on Cowling
(1976) and Cowling and Waterson (1976).
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